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WHAT CONSTITUTES A "MEETING" UNDER THE
MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW?
The Minnesota Open Meeting Law was originally enacted in 1957, in response to
the belief that the public was entitled to greater access to the decisionmaking
processes of governmental bodies. Since then, the law has undergone extensive
amendment and judicial interpretation. In two recent decisions, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has broadened and clarified the definition of the term "meeting"
under the law. This Note examines the development of the defiition, concludes
that further refinement is necessary, and offers a solution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the belief that "[plublic business is the public's busi-
ness,"' all fifty states have enacted open meeting laws.2 By requiring
government bodies to meet openly it is believed that the public's faith in
government will increase.3 Other interests advanced by this openness are
increased public awareness and participation which may foster points of
view that would not otherwise come to light.4 Because of the increased
openness that results from these laws, they are frequently referred to as
"sunshine laws."5
Since no constitutional requirement exists for open meetings, and the
public has no common law right to attend meetings of government bod-
1. Cross, Preface to H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW xii (1953).
2. See Note, The linnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years-A Second Look, 5 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 375, 375 & n.1 (citing 50 state statutes) (1979).
3. See id
4. See id at 377.
5. See, e.g., Comment, Government in the Sunshine Act" A Danger of Overexposure, 14 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 620, 623 (1977).
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ies,6 the task of formulating laws requiring that governmental meetings
be open to the public has been left to state legislatures. 7 In fulfilling this
task, states have taken varying approaches.a
This Note will examine the issue of what constitutes a meeting under
the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.9 After tracing the law's statutory
development, the Note will examine the development of the definition of
the term "meeting" under the law, focusing on two recent decisions by
the Minnesota Supreme Court. Although an analysis of these decisions
indicates that they have substantially increased the effectiveness of the
law, this Note concludes that further judicial action is necessary and of-
fers a possible solution.
II. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINNESOTA
OPEN MEETING LAW
The forerunner of Minnesota's present open meeting law was enacted
in 1957 and applied only to public bodies below the state level.o As
originally adopted, it contained no enforcement provision. It was
amended in 1967 to require the recording of votes on certain money ap-
propriations.II Significant changes occurred in 1973 when the statute
was amended a second time.12 Coverage was extended to state govern-
mental entities and all subordinate components of governing bodies,13
and an enforcement provision was added.14 In 1981, the law was
amended to allow the governing body of a public employer to hold a
closed meeting to consider strategy for labor negotiations.15 In 1983, the
open meeting law was amended a fourth time. This amendment pro-
6. See Note, Open Meeting Statutes." The Press Fghtsfor the "Right to Know' 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1199, 1203 (1962).
7. See Note, supra note 2, at 378.
8. See Note, supra note 6, at 1205-16. The variations in the laws include: (1) a defini-
tion of "meeting"; (2) statutory exceptions to the general open meeting requirement; and
(3) enforcement and penalties for violations.
9. For a discussion of the history and past developments of the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law, see Note, supra note 2.
10. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 773, 1957 Minn. Laws 1043 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1982)).
11. See Act of May 16, 1967, ch. 462, 1967 Minn. Laws 988 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1982)).
12. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 680, 1973 Minn. Laws 1834 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1982)).
13. MINN. STAT. § 10.41, the parallel statute applying to state agencies and depart-
ments, also enacted in 1957, was merged into MINN. STAT. § 471.705 in 1973. See Act of
May 24, 1973, ch. 680, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1835.
14. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 680, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1834, 1835 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1982)). This amendment also gave the statute its
official name. See id § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 1836 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 471.705, subd. 3 (1982)).
15. See Act of May It, 1981, ch. 174, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 516 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. la (1982)). This amendment requires that certain proce-
[Vol. I I
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vides that at least one copy of any written materials used at the meeting
be available in the meeting room for inspection by the public.16
dural requirements be met each time a meeting is closed. See znfra note 55 and accompa-
nying text.
16. See Act of May 12, 1983, ch. 137, § 1, 1983 Minn. Laws 377 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. lb (Supp. 1983)). This amendment provides for a fine, not
to exceed $100, for an intentional violation. Id
With these amendments, the current version of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
provides:
471.705 MEETINGS OF GOVERNING BODIES; OPEN TO PUBLIC; EX-
CEPTIONS.
Subdivision 1. Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meet-
ings, including executive sessions, of any state agency, board, commission or de-
partment when required or permitted by law to transact public business in a
meeting, and the governing body of any school district however organized, unor-
ganized territory, county, city, town, or other public body, and of any commit-
tee, subcommittee, board, department or commission thereof, shall be open to
the public, except meetings of the board of pardons and the corrections board.
The votes of the members of such state agency, board, commission or depart-
ment or of such governing body, committee, subcommittee, board, department
or commission on any action taken in a meeting herein required to be open to
the public shall be recorded in a journal kept for that purpose, which journal
shall be open to the public during all normal business hours where such records
are kept. The vote of each member shall be recorded on each appropriation of
money, except for payments of judgments, claims and amounts fixed by statute.
This section shall not apply to any state agency, board, or commission when
exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings.
Subd. Ia. Subdivision I does not apply to a meeting held pursuant to the
procedure in this subdivision. The governing body of a public employer may by
a majority vote in a public meeting decide to hold a closed meeting to consider
strategy for labor negotiations, including negotiation strategies or developments
or discussion and review of labor negotiation proposals, conducted pursuant to
sections 179.61 to 179.76. The time of commencement and place of the closed
meeting shall be announced at the public meeting. A written roll of members
and all other persons present at the closed meeting shall be made available to the
public after the closed meeting. The proceedings of a closed meeting to discuss
negotiation strategies shall be tape recorded at the expense of the governing
body and shall be preserved by it for two years after the contract is signed and
shall be made available to the public after all labor contracts are signed by the
governing body for the current budget period.
If an action is brought claiming that public business other than discussions
of labor negotiation strategies or developments or discussion and review of labor
negotiation proposals was transacted at a closed meeting held pursuant to this
subdivision during the time when the tape is not available to the public, the
court shall review the recording of the meeting in camera. If the court deter-
mines that no violation of this section is found, the action shall be dismissed and
the recording shall be preserved in the records of the court until otherwise made
available to the public pursuant to this section. If the court determines that a
violation of this section is found, the recording may be introduced at trial in its
entirety subject to any protective orders as requested by either party and deemed
appropriate by the court.
The prevailing party in an action brought before or after the tape is made
available to the public which establishes that a violation of this section has oc-
curred shall recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the
court.
Subd. lb. In any meeting which under subdivision 1 must be open to the
public, at least one copy of any printed materials relating to the agenda items of
19851
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF "MEETING" IN THE
MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW
A difficult issue to resolve when dealing with open meeting laws is
what constitutes a meeting under the law. According to one commenta-
tor, the most effective statutes are those which contain an express defini-
tion of what constitutes a public meeting or proceeding.' 7 Consistent
with this view, many state statutes include such a definition.18 Some of
these statutes focus on the activity that takes place and define a meeting
the meeting which are prepared or distributed by or at the direction of the gov-
erning body or its employees and which are:
(1) distributed at the meeting to all members of the governing body;
(2) distributed before the meeting to all members; or
(3) available in the meeting room to all members;
shall be available in the meeting room for inspection by the public. The materi-
als shall be available to the public while the governing body considers their sub-
ject matter. This subdivision does not apply to materials classified by law as
other than public as defined in chapter 13, or to materials relating to the agenda
items of a closed meeting held in accordance with the procedures in subdivision
la or other law permitting the closing of meetings. If a member intentionally
violates the requirements of this subdivision, that member shall be subject to a
civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100. An action to enforce this penalty
may be brought by any person in any court of competent jurisdiction where the
administrative office of the member is located.
Subd. 2. Any person who violates subdivision 1 shall be subject to personal
liability in the form of a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100 for a
single occurrence. An action to enforce this penalty may be brought by any
person in any court of competent jurisdiction where the administrative office of
the governing body is located. Upon a third violation by the same person con-
nected with the same governing body, such person shall forfeit any further right
to serve on such governing body or in any other capacity with such public body
for a period of time equal to the term of office such person was then serving. The
court determining the merits of any action in connection with any alleged third
violation shall receive competent, relevant evidence in connection therewith and,
upon finding as to the occurrence of a separate third violation, unrelated to the
previous violations issue its order declaring the position vacant and notify the
appointing authority or clerk of the governing body. As soon as practicable
thereafter the appointing authority or the governing body shall fill the position
as in the case of any other vacancy.
Subd. 3. This section may be cited as the "Minnesota Open Meeting Law".
MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
17. Comment, Open Meeting Laws.- An Anal'ysis and Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, 1167
(1974). According to this Comment, an adequate definition of a public meeting must
contain: "(1) a statement of how many members of a particular body gathering together
constitutes a public meeting; (2) a provision which excludes social meetings or chance
encounters from the requirement of openness; and (3) a specific declaration that all the
deliberative stages of the decision-making process are required to be open to the public."
Id
18. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (Cum. Supp. 1983) ("public meetings" are
meetings of bodies supported by public funds); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-2(3) (1976) (con-
vening of quorum to take action or to deliberate over matters in body's jurisdiction);
IDAHO CODE § 67-2341 (1980) ("convening of a governing body of any public agency to
make a decision or to deliberate toward a decision on any matter"); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-
14-1.5-2(c) (1982) (gathering of a majority to take official action); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.82(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (convening of members of a governmental body
[Vol. I11
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as a gathering at which a governmental agency takes official action. 19
This approach promotes predictability since public officials generally
know when official action on any given subject will occur. The problem
with this approach, however, is that it allows public officials to conduct
"rerun" voting in public after reaching decisions in private. 20 Some ju-
risdictions avoid this problem by encompassing deliberation as well as
action.21
Other statutes focus on the number of members of a public body pres-
ent at a gathering, specifying that there must be a quorum 22 or a major-
ity 23 to constitute a meeting. The quorum requirement has been
criticized as providing an opportunity for public officials to evade the
law.24 Critics argue that public officials may simply gather in groups of
less than a quorum, debate and decide the issue, and then reconvene at
an open meeting to formalize what has already been decided behind
closed doors.25 This problem is remedied, to a certain extent, by the
majority requirement since constituent parts of a body holding the nu-
merical power to control a vote must meet in public. 26
Contrary to the above approaches, the drafters of the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law did not include a definition of the term "meeting" in the
for purpose of exercising responsibilities vested in body; does not include any social or
chance gathering or conference which is not intended to avoid this subchapter).
19. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 (Supp. 1983-1984) ("legal action"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-3301(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) ("official actions"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 262 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) ("formal action").
20. See Wickham, Let the Sunshine In! Open Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed
Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 492-93 (1973).
21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1983); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 28A.2(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.262
(b) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10(d) (1983).
Other jurisdictions, in response to this type of concern, have judicially broadened the
scope of their statutes to include meetings at which deliberations occur. The Florida
Supreme Court has concluded that the Florida statute was intended to cover those meet-
ings at which public officials discuss matters that foreseeably could result in the taking of
official action. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 1969); see also
Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (legis-
lature intended to include acts of deliberation before "formal action" of governing bodies).
22. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 (Supp. 1983-1984); HAwAII REV. STAT.
§ 92-2(3) (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(B) (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-102(b)
(1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § l(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
23. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.2(2)
(West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10(d) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:4-8(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page
1984).
24. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1170.
25. See id, see also 7 Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 39, 42 (Oct. 28, 1974). This opinion is
based on the belief that a gathering, however informal, of less than a quorum "might well
subvert the law's purposes just as effectively as a deliberation between a quorum or more
26. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1170.
19851
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statute. Tapes of the committee hearings reveal that the legislature in-
tentionally passed a broad policy statement to be further refined by the
courts. 27 The lawmakers believed that while openness in government
was desirable, it would be impossible to anticipate every fact situation
which might arise under the law. 28 The Minnesota Supreme Court has
held that the law "is to be broadly construed in favor of the public."
29
The court has emphasized the importance of adequate notice and the
opportunity for public access to meetings required to be open under the
statute,30 and has recently made significant contributions to resolving the
question of what constitutes a meeting under the statute.
A. St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools
The first significant Minnesota case to deal with this issue was St. Cloud
27. See Hearngs on SF 1480 Before the Government Structures Subcommittee of the Senate
Governmental Operations Committee, 68th Minn. Legis., 1973 Sess., Apr. 10, 1983 (audio tape).
Senator Humphrey at a subcommittee hearing explained that the courts would have to
clarify the application of the statute:
I wish the committee would understand that I honestly believe that this is going
to have to be perfected by judicial interpretation; [there are] any number of
instances that this is going to have to occur, but we have stated a very broad
policy here.
Id
28. See Floor Debate on SF 1480 in the Minnesota House of Representatives, 68th Minn.
Legis., 1973 Sess., May 18, 1973 (audio tape). The general flavor of the debate was that
openness in government is desirable, but that courts would need to examine difficult pol-
icy issues in the future. See also Interview with John McDonough, in-house legal counsel
for Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., in St. Paul, Minnesota (June 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as McDonough Interview]. Mr. McDonough also expressed the problems that arise in
attempting to develop abstract fact situations.
[Tlhis is where we make a mistake, when we sit down and try and, in the ab-
stract, develop fact situations. I can give you lots of them. What if the chairman
calls up the board members one by one to take a vote ahead of the meeting.
What if the meeting is held in a small room which fits the board but no room for
you or the reporter. What if the officials get together at a cocktail party, Joe's
Bar, the coffee shop and discuss business. You know you could take this forever.
There's no resolution of them.
Id.
29. Merz v. Leitch, 342 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Minn. 1984).
30. See id. (law is to be broadly construed in favor of the public; conducting a meeting
where time and place have not been given in advance, or conducting a meeting prior to
the time public was led to believe meeting was to commence, violates law); Sullivan v.
Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 174, 217 N.W.2d 502, 505 (1974) ("The language
of the statute directing that meetings be open to the public is meaningless if the public has
no knowledge that the meeting is to take place."); Quast v. Knutson, 276 Minn. 340, 150
N.W.2d 199 (1965) (school board meeting held outside the territorial boundaries of the
school district violated statute). But see 6 Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 15, 16 (Feb. 13, 1973)
(town board meetings are not required to be held within the township if there is no suita-
ble public place to meet in the township); Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 471-e (Nov. 2, 1965)
(while a village council cannot hold regular meetings in a place outside the village limits,
it could on a temporary basis use a convenient site located outside the village limits, pro-
vided that there were no convenient and adequate facilities inside the boundaries).
[Vol. I11
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/10
OPEN MEETING LAW
Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools.31 In St. Cloud Newspapers
the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the definition of "meeting"
under the statute, holding that school board administrative seminars at
which discussions are held concerning matters which could foreseeably
require final action by the board, are within the coverage of the statute.
32
St. Cloud Newspapers involved two separate administrative seminars.
The first was held on September 22 and 23, 1980, at the Sunwood Inn in
St. Cloud, Minnesota. 33 The seminar was attended by the entire school
board, eight district administrators, and the secondary school princi-
pals.34 No public notice of the meeting was given.35 Discussions at the
meeting focused on long-range planning for the school district.36 The
meeting was designed to provide the board with factual information con-
cerning issues facing the school district and the education system in gen-
eral.37 The discussions did not relate to matters pending before the
board.38 No attempts were made to resolve specific problems of the
school district.39 No decisions or pre-decisions were made.4
0
The second seminar was held on August 12 and 13, 1981, at the Holi-
day Inn in Alexandria, Minnesota. a 1 The entire school board was pres-
ent along with the superintendent of schools and three assistant
superintendents. 42 Public notice was not given.43 The purpose of the
seminar was to provide an opportunity to exchange factual information
and was not directed toward resolving specific problems of the school
district.44 Again, no decisions or pre-decisions were made. 45 A reporter
31. 332 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1983).
32. Id. at 6. The court also held that the Minnesota Open Meeting Law is not uncon-
stitutionally vague or overbroad, id. at 7, and that a superintendent of schools is not sub-
ject to the law. Id. at 8. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. For an
excellent discussion of the constitutional issues arising under open meeting legislation, see
Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constltutizn, 26
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1957). In Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. Bennett, 321 N.W.2d 395
(Minn. 1982) the court held that a superintendent of schools is not subject to the open
meeting law. Bennett was decided after the trial court had issued its decision in St. Cloud
Newspapers.
33. 332 N.W.2d at 2.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id at 3. "Some of the topics discussed were: long-range planning; enrollment
decline and its implications; goals of the board of education; administrative and district-
wide reassignments and staff reductions; computer services; building utilization; manage-








44. Id Some of the topics discussed at the Alexandria seminar were: kindergarten
1985]
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for the St. Cloud Daily Times inadvertently learned of the unannounced
seminars and, through her employer, sued District 742 Community
Schools, claiming the two seminars violated the open meeting law.
4 6
The trial court held that gatherings or seminars at which factual infor-
mation is presented for the education of school board members are
outside the scope of the statute. 47 The Minnesota Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that administrative seminars are within the coverage of
the open meeting law.48
Since neither the legislature nor the Minnesota Supreme Court had
previously attempted to define the term "meeting" under the statute, the
court first looked to the statute's purpose.49 Although the legislature did
not include a statement of purpose when it enacted the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law,50 the omission had been remedied through judicial action.
In a prior decision, the court had stated that the main purpose of the
Minnesota Open Meeting Law was "to prohibit actions being taken at
secret meetings where it. . . [was] impossible for the interested public to
become fully informed . . . or to detect improper influences."51 In two
other cases the court had ruled that the law assured the public of its right
to be informed52 and provided the public with the opportunity to express
organization; the Area Learning Center; improving instruction processes; transportation
funding; building space utilization; long-range predictability of school attendance areas;




47. Id. at 4. The Stearns County District Court interpreted a meeting subject to the
law as any activity or gathering at which deliberations on pending matters are made or
any decisions or pre-decisions are reached, or even where there is an attempt to reach a
consensus on matters being discussed. See id
48. 332 N.W.2d at 8. The specific question the court faced was:
Whether gatherings of all members of a school board and district administrators
for the purpose of providing the board members with background information
concerning issues currently facing the educational system in general and the
school district in particular, where the school board members take no official
action to resolve specific problems of the school district, constitute "meetings"
under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.
Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 4.
50. According to one commentator, one of the most important considerations in
drafting open meeting legislation is the inclusion of a clear statement of purpose. Wick-
ham, supra note 20, at 488. Such a statement, it is argued, leads to more effective applica-
tion of the statute when it is judicially construed. Consistent with this reasoning, many
open meeting laws contain a statement of purpose. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.312
(1983); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 92-1 (1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-201 (1983).
51. Lindahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 167, 133 N.W.2d
23, 26 (1965).
52. Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 313, 215
N.W.2d 814, 821 (1974). This understanding of the open meeting principle is consistent
with the views taken by other courts. See, e.g., Graybill v. Oklahoma State Bd. of Educ.,
[Vol. 11
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its views. 53 The St. Cloud Newspapers court cited these cases as support for
its determination that the administrative seminars at issue were "meet-
ings" within the scope of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. 54
The St. Cloud Newspapers court noted that there were two basic ap-
proaches states may adopt in defining which meetings are required to be
open under the law.5 5 Although the Minnesota legislature did not define
what constitutes a meeting under the statute, the court stated that the
legislature "clearly intended that all meetings of public agencies be open,
with rare and carefully restrained exception."56 The court found sup-
port for this presumption of openness in the language of the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law, which states that "allmeetings. .. shall be open to
the public."5
7
As further evidence of this presumption of openness, the St. Cloud
Newspapers court pointed to the legislative restraint exercised in drafting
the exception for labor negotiation strategy meetings.58 The court stated
that this restraint was indicated by certain procedural requirements, in-
cluded by the legislature, which public bodies must meet to fall within
the exception.59
As further support for a presumption of openness, the court pointed to
the judicial restraint evidenced by its prior decision allowing a limited
exception for attorney-client meetings.60 Originally adopted in Mi'nneap-
585 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Okla. 1978) (purpose of law is for public to know how each board
member voted on an issue).
53. See Sullivan, 299 Minn. at 175, 217 N.W.2d at 506 (quoting 5 Op. Minn. Att'y
Gen. No. 63a-5 (Feb. 2, 1972)).
54. 332 N.W.2d at 4.
55. See id. at 5. "Each legislature that chooses to enact an open meeting law must
select between the position that everything not specifically closed is opened and the posi-
tion that everything not specifically opened is closed." Id
56. Id (emphasis in original).
57. Id (emphasis in original). See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1.
58. 332 N.W.2d at 5. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. la.
59. 332 N.W.2d at 5. To safeguard against abuses, public bodies must meet certain
procedural requirements: (1) the decision to close the meeting must be made by majority
vote at a public meeting during which the time of commencement and place of the closed
meeting must be announced; (2) a written roll of all persons present at the closed meeting
must be made available to the public after the closed meeting; (3) the closed meeting must
be tape recorded at the expense of the public body and this tape must be preserved for two
years after the labor contract discussed is signed; and (4) in addition, the tape of the
meeting must be made available to the public after all labor contracts are signed by the
public body for that current budget year. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. Ia.
This legislative restraint is also evident in the narrow exception exempting the quasi-
judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings of state agencies, boards or commis-
sions found in MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1. This exception is limited in its application
to disciplinary proceedings and does not permit an agency to meet privately merely be-
cause it is engaged in a quasi-judicial activity. See id
60. 332 N.W.2d at 5; see also Channel /0, Inc., 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814, where
the court, in reversing the trial court's decision to grant eight exceptions to the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law, stated that, "Open meeting laws and their exceptions are a develop-
1985]
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ohs Star and Tribune v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority,61 the court lim-
ited the exception to strategy meetings with attorneys involving
threatened or pending litigation and concluded with the following cau-
tionary words:
The attorney-client exception discussed herein would almost never ex-
tend to the mere request for general legal advice or opinion by a public
body in its capacity as a public agency. We cannot emphasize too
strongly that should this exception be applied as a barrier against pub-
lic access to public affairs, it will not be tolerated .... 62
ing field of law and at this stage we are inclined to employ judicial restraint." Id at 319,
215 N.W.2d at 826.
For a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court did not exercise judicial restraint
in allowing an exception to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, see Bennett, 321 N.W.2d
395. Bennett dealt with the exception to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law for labor nego-
tiations provided for in MINN. STAT. § 179.69, subd. 2 (1980). Under this exception all
negotiations, mediation sessions and hearings between public employees and public em-
ployers or their respective representatives, although statutorily required to be open, may
be closed at the discretion of the director of mediations. See id This exception was given a
broad interpretation by the Bennett court. In rejecting a narrow interpretation of the ex-
ception, the court determined that in the interests of efficient dispute resolution not only
could the mediator meet with both sides in private, but that each side could meet sepa-
rately in private without the mediator present. Although this exception is limited to only
those meetings which the mediator authorizes to be non-public, the Bennett court liberally
interpreted this requirement to include implied authorization as well as express authoriza-
tion. Id. at 399; cf Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972). In Bassett the Florida
Supreme Court, which has liberally interpreted that state's open meeting law, considered
whether to recognize a judicial exception for certain aspects of labor negotiations and
negotiation strategy sessions.
Other exceptions are allowed under the law. The Attorney General, focusing on an
individual's right to privacy, has stated that county welfare board meetings which pertain
to grants or services to specific persons constitute a permissible exception to the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law. In balancing the public's interest in being informed with the individ-
ual's right of privacy, the Attorney General determined that if such meetings were made
open to the public, needy persons would be discouraged from applying for welfare assist-
ance. See 5 Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 125-a-64 (Dec. 4, 1972).
For a discussion of other exceptions to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, see Note,
supra note 2, at 400-410.
61. 310 Minn. 313, 251 N.W.2d 620 (1976). In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., prior to
a regularly scheduled meeting of the HRA, the HRA members met with their attorneys in
a closed meeting to discuss strategy in connection with litigation challenging the HRA
environmental impact statement of a controversial HRA housing project. A reporter,
present to cover the public meeting, sought admission to the closed meeting, but was de-
nied admission on the recommendation of the HRA attorney. The HRA attorney by
affidavit indicated that the closed meeting related solely to the Cedar Riverside environ-
mental litigation strategy.
62. Id at 323-24, 251 N.W.2d at 625, quoted in St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 5;
see also Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968), where the court expressed a similar concern that the
attorney-client privilege only be used in limited circumstances:
Public board members, sworn to uphold the law, may not arbitrarily or unneces-
sarily inflate confidentiality for the purpose of deflating the spread of the public
meeting law. Neither the attorney's presence nor the happenstance of some kind
[Vol. I11
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The St. Cloud Newspapers court reviewed other jurisdictions which have
adopted similar presumptions of openness and discovered that these ju-
risdictions have also adopted broad definitions of the term "meeting."63
After reviewing these decisions, the court held that the public must have
access to the collective reasoning behind a decision and not merely the
decision itself.64 According to the court's theory, if deliberations occur
outside a public meeting, the public loses its right to participate in the
decisionmaking process.65 The court reasoned that since deliberations
of lawsuit may serve as the pretext for secret consultations whose revelation will
not injure the public interest.
Id at 58, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
63. 332 N.W.2d at 5-6; see Bagby v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 434, 528 P.2d
1299, 1302 (1974) (holding "that regardless of whether formal action is taken, when a
'conference' (or any other kind of gathering) is preceded by notice, and held with regular-
ity at specific times and places for the purpose of discussing Board business, it is a 'meet-
ing.' "); State ex. rel. Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 691, 239 N.W.2d 313, 333 (1976)
(holding that closed meetings of the Joint Committee on Finance of the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture were in violation of the state's open meeting law and expressing concern that al-
though no offical action was taken at these "executive sessions," they were nevertheless an
important part of the decisionmaking process of which the public had a right to be in-
formed). But see Commonwealth v. Steward, 24 Pa. Commw. 493, 357 A.2d 255 (1976).
In Steward, the permit for a new sanitary landfill operation was issued without a public
meeting. The court held that the director's issuance of a permit was not "formal action"
and therefore did not constitute a meeting under the statute. Id at 497-98, 357 A.2d at
257.
64. 332 N.W.2d at 6. See Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 50, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 487 ("Only by embracing the collective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as
the ultimate step of official action, can an open meeting regulation frustrate these evasive
devices"); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 1969) (court refused
to define "meeting" on the basis of a formal and informal distinction; instead the court
stated that the public has a right to the entire decisionmaking process); Orange County
Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409, 415, 401 N.Y.S.2d 84, 89 (1978)
afd, 45 N.Y.2d 947, 383 N.E.2d 1157, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1978) ("the Legislature intended
to include more than the mere formal act of voting. . . . It is the entire decision-making
process that the Legislature intended to affect by the enactment of this [open meeting]
statute"); State v. Swanson, 92 Wis. 2d 310, 315-16, 284 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (1979) ("con-
ference" convened for the purpose of exchanging information and not for the purpose of
exercising committee's responsibilities, authorities, or duties held to be in violation of open
meeting law). But see Bassett, 262 So. 2d at 427 (recognizing that some aspects of delibera-
tion are too remote from making formal decisions to have to occur in public meetings);
Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 253 S.E.2d 377, 383 (W. Va. 1979)
(holding that not all aspects of the decisionmaking process should be subject to open meet-
ing law requirements because of the impracticability of trying to render the entire process
open to the public).
65. Thus, in order to protect the public's right to be informed, the public must be
informed about the factors that are the basis for a decision and the positions that individ-
ual public officers take with respect to a specific decision. To avoid mere public "ceremo-
nial acceptance" of decisions that have been agreed to privately in advance, deliberations
leading to a decision must be conducted publicly. See Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison,
296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974). This view is consistent with the Minnesota Attorney
General's interpretation of the Minnesota Supreme Court's holdings. See 7 Op. Minn.
Att'y Gen. 63-a-5 (Oct. 28, 1974). According to the Attorney General, the concept of
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are such an integral part of the decisionmaking process, the definition of
"meeting" should include the deliberations of public officials as well.66
Accordingly, the court held that since the meetings were scheduled meet-
ings where all members of the school board were present and that discus-
sions were held at these meetings which could foreseeably require final
action by the board, they were required to be open.
67
Justice Simonett, concurring in part and dissenting in part, distin-
guished the more general agenda of the Sunwood Inn seminar from that
of the Alexandria seminar, where problems of a specific nature were dis-
cussed. 68 He stated that the Sunwood Inn seminar was not "the type of
discussion that impairs the public's right of input in the decisionmaking
process, since it occurs at such a remote stage of that process."6 9 Justice
Simonett reasoned that "[tihe decisionmaking process advances along a
continuum"70 and that discussions on the remote end of this continuum
should remain outside the scope of the law.71 In his view an unduly
"deliberation" encompasses the collective fact gathering and discussion that is preliminary
to an ultimate decision. Id.; see also II Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 471-e (May 23, 1978). In this
opinion the Attorney General stated that "some discussion or deliberation or other joint
activity between or among members of the same body must ordinarily occur before any
violation of the open meeting law could be found." Id.
According to one commentator the explicit inclusion of the subordinate components
(ie., committees and subcommittees) in the Minnesota Open Meeting Law was meant to
assure the public that even the preliminary steps of reaching a decision will be open to the
public. See Note, supra note 2, at 387. This is supported by the comments of Senator
Humphrey when he explained that the words "committee" and "subcommittee" were
inserted in the open meeting law to prevent public bodies from regularly going into com-
mittees and reclusing into executive sessions prior to their public meetings. See Hearings on
SF 1480 Before the Senate Governmental Operations Commttee, 68th Minn. Legis., 1973 Sess.,
Apr. 20, 1973 (audio tape).
66. See 332 N.W.2d at 6. Other jurisdictions, however, distinguishing between the
information gathering and deliberation phases of public decisionmaking, have held that
public bodies may deliberate in private despite the provisions of open meeting laws. See
Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979); see also
Arizona Press Club, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 Ariz. 545, 558 P.2d 697
(1976); Stillwater Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oklahoma Sav. & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9 (Okla.
1975); School Dist. No. 9 v. District Boundary Bd., 351 P.2d 106, 110 (Wyo. 1960).
67. 332 N.W.2d at 6.
68. Id at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This opinion was
joined by Justice Kelley.
69. Id.
70. Id at 8 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Appalachian
Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 253 S.E.2d 377 (W. Va. 1979). The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals analyzed the process that begins with deliberation and
culminates in a decision. The court acknowledged that staff consultations and delibera-
tions are elements in a continuum of decisionmaking. Id at 381.
71. 332 N.W.2d at 8 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
Appalachian Power Co., 253 S.E.2d at 383. In holding that staff consultations and delibera-
tions were not within the statutory definition of a meeting, the court noted the impractica-
bility of trying to render the entire process open to the public:
Consultations, deliberations and the process of making a decision might often
[Vol. I I
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broad application of the open meeting law would chill speech unnecessa-
rily.72 He noted that the legislature did not attempt to draft a statute
which would cover every situation, but rather attempted to draft legisla-
tion with "the expectation that situations at the remote end of the deci-
sionmaking continuum would be subject to judicial interpretation in a
particular factual setting."73 Justice Simonett argued that the Sunwood
Inn seminar did not violate the open meeting law because its "agenda
was general and educational in context." 7 4 He agreed, however, that the
seminar in Alexandria should have been open to the public because
"[tihere were items on the Alexandria agenda that went beyond the cus-
tomary background and educational content presented at an administra-
tive seminar . . .,75
B. Issues Remat'ning After St. Cloud Newspapers
The St. Cloud Newspapers court focused on the activity that takes place
at a gathering rather than on the number of members present. The basic
premise for the court's decision was that in order for the public to be
well-informed, it must have access to the decisionmaking process. Specif-
involve more than a single case, and in this regard indicate the impracticability
of making these activities subject to the Act's requirements. Because these activi-
ties are informal occurrences in the Commission's day to day operation, there is
no requirement of a quorum before these activities can take place or before there
can be a "convening" of a consultation, etc.
Id.; see also Bassett, 262 So. 2d 425. The Bassett court recognized that some aspects of
deliberation are too remote from formal decisions to have to occur in public meetings.
The court stated:
Such things germinate gradually and often without really knowing whether any
action or meeting will grow out of the exchanges or thinking. Every action ema-
nates from thoughts and creations of the mind and exchanges with others. These
are perhaps "deliberations" in a sense but hardly demanded to be brought for-
ward in the spoken word at a public meeting. To carry matters to such an ex-
treme approaches the ridiculous; it would defeat any meaningful and productive
process of government. One must maintain perspective on a board provision
such as this legislative enactment, in its application to the actual workings of an
active Board fraught with many and varied problems and demands.
Id at 427-28.
72. 332 N.W.2d at 8 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Simonett stated that, "To say, for example, that a board member may never talk to an-
other board member outside of a duly called meeting about something that foreseeably
could require board action in the future is unrealistic and chills speech unnecessarily and
perhaps unconstitutionally." Id
73. Id at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Floor Debate
on SF 1480 in the Minnesota House of Representatives, 68th Minn. Legib., 1973 Sess., May 18,
1973 (audio tape). In response to an inquiry whether a meeting of city council members
with their legislators to review legislation would be covered, Representative Growe, the
bill's author, replied, "I would say no, but I guess I am not a judge and couldn't make that
decision." Id
74. 332 N.W.2d at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of particular impor-
tance to Justice Simonett were the discussions pertaining to the Area Learning Center and
matters having a bearing on teacher contract negotiations then in progress. Id.
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ically, access to public decisionmaking requires access to the collective
reasoning behind a decision and not merely to the decision itself.76 Thus,
the court held that meetings at which discussions include matters
foreseeably requiring final action by the board must be open. 77 For all
practical purposes this would require virtually all meetings to be open to
the public, since any discussion might conceivably lead to future ac-
tion.78 The court, in reaching its decision, relied upon the underlying
assumption that requiring all meetings to be open leads to a more well-
informed public.
7 9
The validity of this assumption, however, is questionable. Some com-
mentators believe that requiring all meetings to be open actually leads to
a less informed public. 80 They argue that if all meetings are subject to
public scrutiny, the "crucible of informal interchange and debate, which
is the source of most ideas, would be quenched." 8 1 According to this
argument, the candor of public officials would be impaired if they were
forced to express all opinions publicly. As Justice Simonett cautioned,
such a restriction "chills speech." 82 Requiring all meetings to be open
leads to more inhibited discussions since public officials are less likely to
76. See 332 N.W.2d at 6; see also, e.g., Sciolino v. Ryan, 103 Misc. 2d 1021, 431
N.Y.S.2d 664 (1980).
There is general agreement as to the validity of this premise. Dr. Robert Mayer, the
superintendent of Shakopee Independent School District 720, in response to the question
whether the public has a right to be informed not only of the final decision, but of the
reasons for that decision as well, replied, "I would agree with that, I think that is
right, ... [I]f government is to enjoy any degree of confidence it needs to be open."
Interview with Dr. Robert Mayer, Superintendent of Shakopee Independent School Dis-
trict 720, in Shakopee, Minnesota (June 23, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Mayer Interview].
In response to the same question, a member of the school board of Independent School
District 719 replied, "Oh absolutely, absolutely." Interview with William Schmokel,
School Board Member of Independent School District 719, in Shakopee, Minnesota (June
22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Schmokel Interview].
77. 332 N.W.2d at 6.
78. John McDonough, in-house legal counsel for Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., com-
menting on the foreseeability that discussions will require final action by the board, stated
that "nine times out of ten they do ... let's put it ninety-nine times out of a hundred."
McDonough Interview, supra note 28.
79. In response to the question whether the St. Cloud Newspapers decision was a good
decision, John McDonough replied, "Sure . . . as far as the press is concerned, yes ....
As far as the public, you get a better understanding of what's going on with our govern-
mental agencies .... " Id.
80. See, e.g., Tucker, "Sunshine'--The Dubious New Cod, 32 AD. L. REV. 537, 542-43
(1980). According to Mr. Tucker, the goals of promoting openness in government and
educating the public tend not to be achieved by the requirement that public bodies con-
duct business in the public's view. See id.
81. Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REv. 451,
452 (1975); see also Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fhts For the "Right to Know," 75
HARV. L. REv. 1199, 1202 (1962).
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explore unpopular alternatives in public.8 3 This hesitancy is based on
the fear that the public will mistakenly assume that officials who are
merely exploring alternatives in open meetings are actually advocating
these positions.
This concern has been voiced by some Minnesota public officials per-
sonally subject to the law's restraints. One school board member ex-
plains that:
[S]ome board members ...are very fearful to discuss topics at public
meetings because they are afraid that people will get the wrong concep-
tion. For example . . . if I say to an administrator 'what would hap-
pen if we did this,' you've got to be very careful that the public doesn't
perceive that that's my actual feeling. I may not favor that topic but I
might want to know what happens if I had to take that route.84
Since the St. Cloud Newspapers decision requires even the most remote
stages of the decisionmaking process to be open to public scrutiny, public
officials must, in effect, conduct their business in a vacuum. 85 The pre-
clusion of private informal discussion and debate necessarily leads to a
less efficient decisionmaking process.8 6 As one author stated, "Ideas are
83. See Interview with Dr. Robert Mayer, Superintendent of Shakopee Independent
School District 720, in Shakopee, Minnesota (June 23, 1983). Dr. Mayer stated that "in
some instances, [the school board members] don't like to take unpopular positions that
they know are going to be reported .... ." Id.; see also I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION
MAKING-A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT
(1977). These psychologists, utilizing a conflict theory to analyze the decisionmaking pro-
cess, found five distinct stages of decisionmaking. The third stage, "weighing alterna-
tives," involves the determination of which alternative is the best. During this stage,
discussion of alternatives with colleagues is of considerable benefit. According to the au-
thors, when this stage of deliberation takes place in a public forum, the individual is neces-
sarily inhibited from completely considering the options. Id But see Markham, Sunshine on
the Admunistrative Process.- Wherein Lies the Shade? 28 AD. L. REV. 463 (1976). After posing
the argument that the candor of government officials will be impaired if they are forced to
air all their opinions publicly, the author concludes that:
Persons serving as public officials should have the requisite qualifications and
abilities publicly to express their thoughts and publicly to demonstrate their
knowledge of the policy matters they are discussing or advocating. If a bureau-
crat is afraid to present his thoughts other than behind a closed door, then he
may simply be unfit for governmental service.
Id at 474.
84. Schmokel Interview, supra note 76. But see McDonough Interview, supra note 28.
Mr. McDonough felt that there would only be a reluctance to discuss a particular issue in
public if the officials thought they could get away with discussing it in private. Id
85. See Schmokel Interview, supra note 76. Mr. Schmokel, commenting on the impact
of St. Cloud Newspapers, stated that "it makes me make a decision . ..in a vacuum." Id
86. See Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d 1312. In Common Cause the court, distinguish-
ing the information-gathering phase of Commission activities from the actual decision-
making function, stated:
[I]t is clear that the legislature intended that any official meeting of the Commis-
sion, wherein it performs the 'information obtaining' phase of its activities,
should not be held in private or in secret, but should be open to the public.
However, once the 'information obtaining' procedure has been completed, it is
essential that during the 'decision making' or judicial phase, those charged with
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seldom germinated and nurtured to fruition in a vacuum, and the com-
plete details and intricacies of controversial matters are seldom examined
fully in the course of a meeting of a board, whether it be formal or infor-
mal."87 This failure to fully examine all available alternatives in meet-
ings open to the public substantially reduces government's efficiency
without any corresponding increase in public participation.88
The holding in St. Cloud Newspapers failed to resolve the issue of what
informal gatherings must be open under the law.89 While strictly social
encounters are beyond the law's scope,90 it remained unclear what types
of informal gatherings would fall within the law's coverage. What if, for
example, two board members went to a bar for a drink after work and
ended up discussing business? What if three council members discussed
that duty have the opportunity of discussing and thinking about the matter in
private, free from any clamor or pressure, so they can calmly analyze and delib-
erate upon questions of fact, upon the applicable law, and upon considerations
of policy, which bear upon the problems with which they are confronted.
Id. at 1315. Accord Arizona Press Club, Inc., 113 Ariz. at 547, 558 P.2d at 699; Stillwater Say.
&Loan Ass'n, 534 P.2d at 11; SchoolDist. No. 9, 351 P.2d at 110.
87. Little & Tompkins, supra note 81, at 473.
88. According to this view, any gains in the area of greater public participation are
not worth what is lost in efficiency. See Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1313-16. The
Common Cause court, in holding that Utah Public Service Commission deliberations were
not required to be open to the public, balanced two competing interests. On the one
hand, the court noted that it was desirable to allow the public the opportunity to gain
information about important social issues. An open meeting permits the exchange of in-
formation between the public and the commissioners. Id at 1313-14. The court also rec-
ognized, however, that the Commission had an interest in arriving at a decision "free from
the possibility of undue pressures from the presence of partisans." Id at 1314. Privacy in
the decisionmaking process permits the decision to be well-reasoned and in the best inter-
ests of all concerned. Id But see Little & Tompkins, supra note 81, at 475. These authors
maintain that openness in government promotes efficiency as well as a government more
responsive to public interests and less prone to corruption and secrecy. Id; see also McDon-
ough Interview, supra note 28. In response to the question whether government will be less
efficient as a result of St. Cloud Newspapers, Mr. McDonough replied, "No, I don't think
government will be less efficient. It could be more efficient because maybe it will force
[public officials] to be more reflective." Id
89. This uncertainty, coupled with the realization by public officals that it is the mere
accusation of a violation of the open meeting law which does the majority of damage and
not whether it is proven, causes officials to be inhibited in their discussions at public meet-
ings. According to Mr. Schmokel:
[I]n the public sector. . . the mere accusation of a violation [of the open meet-
ing law] is loss of integrity, loss of credibility. Most of the individuals who want
to do you in, blacken your credibility so to speak, are not concerned with
whether they prove or disprove it because they know that 99% of the damage is
done by the mere accusation [of a violation] of the open meeting law.
Schmokel Interview, supra note 76.
90. 332 N.W.2d at 7; see Channel 10, Inc., 298 Minn. at 325, 215 N.W.2d at 827. But see
Comment, supra note 17, at 1170. According to this Comment, "Notwithstanding the be-
lief that social meetings should be specifically excluded, it should be emphasized that a
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business over lunch? What about a phone call between two sewer com-
missioners during which business was discussed? A conference call be-
tween three board members? Four members? Although it may be
inferred from the holding in St. Cloud Newspapers that these types of meet-
ings must be open, such a requirement is unreasonably restrictive.91
Public officials who work together will inevitably have contact with each
other outside of public meetings. Since "shop talk" is rarely limited to
the office, these individuals can be expected to discuss public business
both in and outside such meetings. As one school board member stated,
"When two carpenters meet they talk about carpenter building and
home building. When two surveyors meet they talk about surveying and
how business is going. When board members talk [they] talk of what
[they] have in common."92
C Moberg v. Independent School District No. 281
In Moberg v. Independent School District No. 281,93 the Minnesota
Supreme Court made further refinements by formulating a more com-
prehensive definition of what constitutes a meeting under the law. In
Moberg, the court held that gatherings of at least a quorum or more mem-
bers of a governing body, at which members discuss, decide, or receive
information regarding any matter relating to the official business of that
governing body, constitute a meeting under the Minnesota Open Meet-
ing Law.94
91. According to one commentator, "Informal exchanges between officals may be
necessary to generate ideas and policy alternatives and should be exempted from the open
meeting requirement." Note, supra note 2, at 394. This view has also been expressed by
Minnesota public officials who are subject to the law. School Board Member William
Schmokel, for example, stated that he didn't "think that we can isolate school board mem-
bers and say 'don't meet any other time [other than an open meeting].' " Schmokel Inter-
view, supra note 76.
92. Schmokel Interview, supra note 76.
93. 336 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 1983).
94. Id at 518. The court also held that the school district had complied with the
notice and hearing requirements of the school house closing statute by stating the reasons
for closing known to them and by holding a special public hearing for each school they
considered closing, and that invalidation is not available as a remedy under the open
meeting law. Id These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Note.
For a good discussion of the methods of enforcing open meeting laws, see Note, supra
note 2, at 410-19. No provision authorizing invalidation is included in the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law. The status of invalidation as a remedy in Minnesota remains uncer-
tain. Id at 418. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the open meeting law only
provides statutory penalties in the form of fines or removal from office. Hubbard Broad-
casting, Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 765 (Minn. 1982). In Hubbard Broadcasting,
two members of a city council discussed, over lunch, an application for a special use per-
mit that was pending before the council. The applicant sought to invalidate the later
action of the council denying a special use permit based in part on this luncheon meeting.
The court, in refusing to invalidate the actions, cited Sullian, 229 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d
502, for the proposition that the statute did not specify that action taken at a meeting
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Moberg arose out of a dispute regarding which one of three high schools
would be closed in School District Number 281 due to financial problems
caused by declining enrollment.95 School board members eventually be-
came deadlocked on the issue of which high school to close.96 In an at-
tempt to break the deadlock, the Board appointed a factfinding panel
whose members were instructed to recommend to the Board which two
high schools would best serve the interests of the school district in the
foreseeable future.97 Each of these meetings, except one hearing, was
private.98 In the meantime, individual Board members met privately on
at least seventeen occasions to discuss the school closing, and all Board
members had numerous telephone conversations with other Board mem-
bers concerning the issue. 99 In addition, letters were sent from one Board
member to other Board members in an attempt to persuade them to
change their votes on the school closing issue. 100
On April 26, 1982, the panel recommended closing Robbinsdale Se-
nior High School.1o1 Residents of the district then brought an action for
declaratory judgment against the school district, requesting that the
school district be enjoined from closing the high school, that Board mem-
bers be found in violation of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, and
that the statutory penalties of fines and removal from office be
imposed. 102
The trial court found fourteen of the seventeen gatherings violated the
open meeting law, 103 holding that "the school board members were par-
which is not public should be invalidated. The court held that this particular case did not
concern a meeting where action was taken, only one where discussion occurred, and noted
that "deliberation cannot be nullified." Id. at 765 (quoting Note, supra note 2, at 417).
Therefore, the luncheon conversation was not a violation of the open meeting law which
would invalidate the council's action. Id.
95. 336 N.W.2d at 512. The enrollment decline decreased revenue received from
state sources. The school board closed seven elementary schools and one junior high
school in an effort to curb the district's financial crisis. The school closings failed to gener-
ate sufficient revenue to save the three high schools. Id
96. Id. at 513.
97. Id
98. Id.
99. Id. at 514.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Id. at 512.
103. Id. at 514. The trial court also held that the school district had complied with the
notice and hearing requirements of MINN. STAT. § 123.36, subd. 11 (1982), and that inval-
idation of actions was not an available remedy under the open meeting law. Id The trial
court imposed a fine of $100 against each board member for each violation. Id.
For a discussion of the 1973 amendment to the open meeting law which added an
enforcement provision imposing civil penalties for violations of the law, see Note, supra
note 2, at 412-13. Although Minnesota's open meeting law does not expressly provide for
criminal penalties, it is unclear whether public officials may be subject to criminal sanc-
tions in the event of a violation. This uncertainty arises from a statutory provision making
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ticipating in a 'meeting' whenever they intentionally engaged in deliber-
ation on matters presently pending before the board or matters that
foreseeably would result in the taking of official action."04 On appeal,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute applies
only to gatherings of at least a quorum or more members of a governing
body at which members receive information regarding, or discuss or de-
cide as a group, any matter relating to the official business of that gov-
erning body. 105
In Moberg, the alleged violations involved gatherings ranging in size
from as few as two members to the entire board. 106 Consequently, for
the first time, the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the task of
formulating a comprehensive definition of the term "meeting" under the
law.o 7 In formulating this definition the court noted that it had dealt
with the extremes of this question in two of its recent decisions. 108
At one extreme, the court had held in St. Cloud Newspapers that "previ-
ously scheduled informational seminars about school board business, at-
tended by the whole board, were within the purview of the law and must
be publicized and open."09 The Moberg court concluded that while
"chance or social gatherings" are excluded from the law's coverage, "any
scheduled gathering of all members of a governing body must be noticed
and open, whether or not action is taken or contemplated."' 1o
The Moberg court then turned to the other extreme and reviewed its
decision in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Afton.I 11 The court, while
recognizing that its opinion in Hubbard Broadcasting focused primarily on
available remedies and not on a definition of "meeting" under the stat-
ute, cited Hubbard Broadcasting "for the proposition that a discussion be-
tween two members of a governing body about a matter pending before
it a misdemeanor to perform any act prohibited by statute where no penalty for that
violation is imposed in any statute. See MINN. STAT. § 645.241 (1982). The 1973 amend-
ment to Minnesota's open meeting law provided no criminal penalty, but rather a civil
penalty of $100. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 2 (1982). Whether this provision pro-
vides the penalty contemplated by MINN. STAT. § 645.241 will depend on future
interpretations.
104. 336 N.W.2d at 516.
105. Id at 518. The specific question the court faced was "whether the trial court
properly defined meetings under the Open Meeting Law as two or more members inten-
tionally engaging in deliberation on Board business." Id at 514.
106. Id at 516.
107. Id
108. Id; see St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d 1; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 323 N.W.2d
757.
109. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 516 (citing St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 4).
110. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 516 (citing St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 6). The
Moberg court's reliance on St. Cloud Newspapers may be inappropriate. In St. Cloud Newspa-
pers, the court focused on the nature of the discussion and not on the number of officials
present. See 332 N.W.2d at 6. The conclusion reached by the court in Moberg, however,
appears to focus on the number of officials present. See 336 N.W.2d at 518-19.
111. 323 N.W.2d 757.
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that body is not a per se violation of the statute."112
After dispensing with situations falling at the extreme ends of the spec-
trum, the Moberg court narrowed its task to a determination of whether
gatherings of greater than two, but less than all members of a public
body are subject to the law.'13 The court found the express terms of the
statute offered little assistance in making this determination, stating that
"While the statute clearly requires a meeting of the whole to be noticed
and open, it is not immediately clear whether the law applies to an infor-
mal discussion between a few members."'114
The court in Moberg then reviewed the statutory treatment in other
jurisdictions and discovered that the majority of these jurisdictions have
confined the application of their open meeting laws to a majority or a
quorum of a public body.115 The court concluded that because the Min-
nesota Open Meeting Law speaks only in terms of official units of a "gov-
erning body," the statute impliedly contains a quorum requirement
"since a 'governing body' does in fact consist of a quorum for purposes of
acting with legal effect."
'116
The Moberg court found this conclusion consistent with the legislative
history of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. Although the court ac-
knowledged that "[1legislative history suggests that the Open Meeting
Law was enacted to prevent public bodies from dissolving into executive
session[s] on important but controversial matters, and to insure that the
public has an opportunity both to detect improper influences and to
present its views,"' 17 it recognized that the legislature did not intend the
law "to apply to informal discussions between a few colleagues, or to
groups too small to effect a decision on agency business."' 18
As support for this view the court pointed to the remarks of Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey III and Senator Rolf Nelson during a 1973 Senate
Governmental Operations Committee hearing.1t9 The purpose of this
112. 336 N.W.2d at 516. The court suggested that there may be situations in which a
discussion between two members of a governing body may be a violation.
113. Id at 516-17.
114. Id. at 517. The court noted that the statute "speaks only in terms of official units
of [a] governing body." Id.
115. Id The Moberg court places statutes requiring final action within this majority.
The court reasoned that these statutes contain an "implied" quorum requirement. Id. For
a discussion of jurisdictions which have a majority or quorum requirement, see supra notes
22-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of jurisdictions which require official ac-
tion, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
116. 336 N.W.2d at 517 (footnote omitted). As support for this conclusion the court
cited MINN. STAT. § 123.33, subd. 5 (1982) which "defines a quorum of a school board as
a majority of the voting members." 336 N.W.2d at 517 n.4. According to the court, "the
only relevant distinction between the whole body and its quorum is the proclivity of every
member toward perfect attendance at meetings." Id at 517.





William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/10
OPEN MEETING LAW
hearing was to consider an amendment adding the terms "committee"
and "subcommittee" to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. Senator
Humphrey, one of the authors of the bill, explained that the words "com-
mittee" and "subcommittee" were being inserted to prevent public bod-
ies from regularly going into committees and reclusing into executive
sessions prior to their public meetings.120 Senator Nelson, however, ex-
pressed concern that the statute might prevent two members of a public
body from discussing public business informally.12 1 Senator Humphrey
replied in part that "we're not talking about two individuals going any-
where unless they are a governing body."122
This led the Moberg court to the conclusion that "There is a point be-
yond which open discussion requirements may serve to immobilize a
body and prevent the resolution of important problems."1 23 Conse-
quently, it became apparent to the court that "in formulating a defini-
tion of 'meetings' that must be open, the public's right to be informed
must be balanced against the public's right to the effective and efficient
administration of public bodies."124 Balancing these interests, the court
held that "gatherings of a quorum or more members of [a] governing
body. . at which members discuss, decide, or receive information as a
group on issues relating to the official business of that governing body"
constitute meetings under the law.125 The court cautioned, however,
that "serial meetings in groups of less than a quorum for the purposes of
120. See Hearings on SF 1480 Before the Senate Governmental Operations Committee, 68th
Minn. Legis., 1973 Sess., Apr. 20, 1973 (audio tape).
121. See id. Senator Nelson stated:
I understand that there's some kind of charter provision, I think in St. Paul. Has
this been discussed earlier whereby they have stated that, state something to the
effect that no two people can, they can't have any secret meeting? It's been
interpreted in some quarters as being so broad that two city councilmen or alder-
men can't sit down over a cup of coffee and discuss what, you know, might be
[official] council action, and I'm, I think the thrust of the bill is excellent but I
get a little concerned that I can't go and take my good friend, Senator McCutch-
eon, out for a cup of coffee and talk to him without having a recorded vote.
Id
122. Id The full text of Senator Humphrey's response is:
Mr. Chairman, I don't want to prolong this. But you'll note, it does talk about
governing bodies and agencies and those boards. And we're not talking about
two individuals going anywhere unless they are a governing body. Secondly,
there are going to be, there is always a way to get around the law. All you have
to do is call up an individual, call up five members of the council on the tele-
phone. That's a right of privacy. So people, if they want to have secret meet-
ings, they can. But I think this intends, we ought to be talking about what the
policy of the state ought to be. And I think we have a long ways to go before we
can really say that we're operating public meetings.
Id
123. 336 N.W.2d at 517.
124. Id
125. Id. at 518. The court, while recognizing that "chance or social gatherings" are not
within the scope of the statute, cautioned that "a quorum may not, as a group, discuss or
receive information on official business in any setting under the guise of a private social
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avoiding public hearings or fashioning agreement on an issue may . . .
be found to be a violation of the statute depending upon the facts of the
individual case."' 126
The court, applying the quorum requirement to the fourteen viola-
tions found by the trial court, held that no violations had occurred.127
Of the fourteen violations identified by the trial court, only one involved
a quorum or more of the Board. 2 8 The court held that this gathering,
although involving all the Board members, did not constitute a "meet-
ing" due to the nature of the activities that took place at the
gathering. 129
D. Issues Remai'ing After Moberg
The court in Moberg focused on the number of officials congregating
rather than on the nature of the discussion. By adopting the quorum
requirement the court sought to protect the communication necessary to
govern effectively while protecting the public interest in open
government. '
30
The quorum requirement, however, has been criticized because it may
provide officials with an opportunity to evade the law. According to this
argument, a group of officials comprising a majority could convene a
series of closed meetings of less than a quorum, discuss the issues, reach a
resolution, and agree to vote accordingly at a subsequent open meet-
ing. 131 This concern has been expressed by individuals who confront the
Minnesota Open Meeting Law on a daily basis. John McDonough, in-
house legal counsel for Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., explains that:
what you could do is . . . you could meet where you have less than a
quorum. Let's say there's fifteen members on the commission. So you
have five meeting one time, five in another and five in another, and
gathering." Id The court also held that the statute did not apply to letters or telephone
conversations between members comprising less than a quorum. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 518.
128. Id "This gathering, attended by all Board members, occurred in the superinten-
dent's office shortly before a regular Board meeting." Id
The court noted that the trial court had also identified one other gathering of a quo-
rum, but had found it not to be a violation of the statute. However, since the appellants
did not challenge this finding of the trial court, and because the record of what happened
at that gathering was unclear, the Moberg court declined review. Id at 518 n.6.
129. At this gathering "the superintendent distributed, but did not discuss," written
copies of the questions posed to the superintendent by the fact-finding panel and his re-
sponses to those questions," and invited Board members to give him their reactions indi-
vidually after they had had an opportunity to read the material. Id at 518. The court
stated that "These activities are not in the nature of group receipt of information or group
discussion such that they constitute a 'meeting' within the meaning of the Minnesota stat-
ute." Id
130. Id at 517-18.
131. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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then you cross-fertilize the votes. That would defeat it too, wouldn't
it. 132
The appellants in Moberg made this argument. 33 The court stated in
response that "It does not follow that two- or three-person conversations
should be prohibited, however, because officials who are determined to
act furtively will hold such discussions anyway, or might simply use an
outsider as an intermediary."134 The court concluded that "There is a
way to illegally circumvent any rule the court might fashion, and there-
fore it is important that the rule not be so restrictive as to lose the public
benefit of personal discussion between public officials while gaining little
assurance of openness."135 The court cautioned, however, that serial
gatherings of less than a quorum for purposes of circumventing the law
may constitute a violation.136
Consequently, the court's decision in Moberg, while promoting effi-
ciency in government, also seeks to provide a certain amount of predict-
ability. The court's cautionary words, however, undermine this
predictability. Every time a discussion is held between members consti-
tuting less than a quorum, it may be charged that persuasion designed to
avoid public discussion is occurring. The court gave little insight as to
what facts would evidence such persuasion.
By adopting the quorum requirement, the Moberg court made signifi-
cant strides in clarifying some of the uncertainty that followed St. Cloud
Newspapers.13 7 However, since the result in Moberg focused on the
number of officials present rather than the nature of the activity that
takes place, much of the criticism directed toward St. Cloud Newspapers is
still valid today.
Moberg establishes that all discussions along the decisionmaking contin-
uum involving a quorum or more must be open.138 This includes even
the most remote stages of the decisionmaking process. This requirement
is not conducive to efficient decisionmaking.1 39 According to some com-
mentators, informal exchanges between public officials are necessary to
generate ideas and should be exempted from the open meeting law.140
132. McDonough Interview, supra note 28.
133. 336 N.W.2d at 518.
134. Id
135. Id; see also Telegraph Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 297 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa
1980). According to the Iowa court, any rule applicable to gatherings of fewer than a
majority, at which no decisions are made or official .actions taken, "would hamstring the
progress of governmental bodies, and impose intolerable time burdens on unpaid office-
holders." Id at 534.
136. 336 N.W.2d at 518; see supra text accompanying note 122.
137. See generally supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussion of issues left un-
resolved in St. Cloud Newspapers).
138. 336 N.W.2d at 518.
139. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
140. See Note, supra note 2, at 394.
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This same view has been expressed by Minnesota public officials who are
subject to the law. For example, one official stated that he didn't "think
that we can isolate school board members and say don't meet any other
time [other than an open meeting]. You have to get the feeling of what
the other individual feels for, what his perspective is."141 As Justice
Simonett cautioned in St. Cloud Newspapers, the broad scope of the deci-
sion may "chill speech."1 42 Consequently, in order to achieve a more
effective balance between the government's interest in efficiency and the
public's right to be informed, remote stages of the decisionmaking pro-
cess should fall outside the scope of the law.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to more fully realize the purposes of the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law, 14 3 further refinements of the definition of a "meeting"
under the law are necessary. One approach would be to remove remote
stages of the decisionmaking process from the law's coverage. This could
be accomplished by further limiting the law's application to only those
gatherings where discussions are held concerning substantive issues pend-
ing before the public body. This approach has been criticized for al-
lowing too much room for abuse.144 Even assuming that this represents a
valid concern, however, an adequate method exists for safeguarding the
public against abuse.
Since the statute applies only to governmental bodies,14 5 the individu-
als who are subject to the law's constraints are either publicly-elected
officials or are directly accountable to such officials. Consequently, they
are subject, either directly or indirectly, to the electoral process. If the
public does not have confidence in an official, it can use the electoral
process to remove him.
Limiting the law's coverage in this manner would provide public offi-
cials the opportunity to engage in some uninhibited discussion at the
early stages of the decisionmaking process. This opportunity for unin-
hibited discussion would ensure the consideration of all available alterna-
tives, which might not occur if the gathering were required to be open. 146
141. Schmokel Interview, supra note 76.
142. 332 N.W.2d at 8 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
144. McDonough Interview, supra note 28.
145. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1.
146. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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The recent developments in the Minnesota Supreme Court concerning
the definition of a "meeting" under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
have substantially increased the effectiveness of the law. By adopting a
quorum requirement in Moberg, the court answered many of the ques-
tions raised by its decision in St. Cloud Newspapers. Some uncertainty still
exists, however. The Moberg court, while warning that serial gatherings
of less than a quorum for purposes of circumventing the law may consti-
tute a violation, failed to indicate what facts would be necessary to estab-
lish such a violation. The legislature or the court may have to come to
grips with this issue in the future and provide some guidance as to what
constitutes undue persuasion.
Further legislative or judicial refinements of the definition of a "meet-
ing" under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law are necessary. St. Cloud
Newspapers and Moberg establish that all discussions along the decision-
making continuum involving a quorum or more must be open. This re-
quirement encompasses even the most remote stages of the
decisionmaking process, and may hamper the ability of government bod-
ies to operate efficiently. The legislature or the court should further limit
the coverage of the law to those gatherings which include discussions
concerning substantive issues pending before the public body. This limi-
tation would provide an adequate balance between the government's in-
terests in efficiency and the public's right to be informed.
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